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Why Bernie Is Confused:
Populist and Progressive Strands in Liberal Constitutionalism
Louis Michael Seidman*
Introduction
Here is what Bernie Sanders thinks about the federal government:
[I]t doesn’t matter what party is in power, because the real power, economically and
politically, rests with a billionaire class. . . . It’s not the Republican Party, per se. It is not the
Democratic Party, per se. It is the billionaire party, led by people like the Koch brothers and
Sheldon Adelson. And they are the dominant political force in this country, because they can
spend unbelievable sums of money on elections.1
And here is what Bernie Sanders thinks we should do about American health care:
The solution to this crisis is not hard to understand. A half-century ago, the United States
established Medicare. Guaranteeing comprehensive health benefits to Americans over 65
has proved to be enormously successful, cost-effective and popular. Now is the time to
expand and improve Medicare to cover all Americans.2
Not all modern liberals agree with these specific views, but all modern liberals share the
sensibilities that lie behind the views. Modern liberalism is defined by the twin goals of reducing the
influence of money on politics and expanding government programs designed to dismantle various
unjust power hierarchies and to benefit the poor and middle class.3 Both commitments reflect the
broader view that unbridled private economic power produces unjust outcomes for too many
Americans.
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160 Cong. Rec. S1806 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2014) (statement of Sen. Sanders).
2
Sanders, “Why We Need Medicare for All,” N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2017, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/opiion/bernie-sanders-medicare-somg;e-payer.html?mcubz=0
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See, e.g., Tara Golshan, “Democrats’ New ‘Better Deal for Our Democracy’ Explained, Vox, May 21, 2018,
at https://www.vox.com/2018/5/21/17376128/democrats-better-deal-democracy-midterm-2018 (emphasizing
reforms to promote economic and political equality); Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and
Economic Inequality, 85 U. Chi L. Rev. 369, 370, 396 (2018) (arguing that “rising economic inequality can
undermine a well-functioning democracy” and that “the incumbent power of the wealthy . . . influence legislative
and electoral processes”); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic
Inequality Threatens our Republic 3-5 (2017) (economic inequality threatens structure of government).
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But the commitments are difficult to reconcile. If, as Sanders asserts, the federal government
has been captured by a “billionaire party” determined to wield public power for private gain, then why
would anyone want to turn over roughly 18 percent of the American economy to Washington?4
Conversely, if, as Sanders also asserts, federal health insurance has been “enormously successful, cost
effective and popular,” then how can it be that the program is under the thumb of a selfish plutocracy?5
There is a history to this contradiction. Modern American liberalism is an amalgam of older
populist and progressive impulses with deep roots in the country’s past. The story is confused and
complicated because the populist and progressive movements overlapped and because politicians and
political movements cannot be reduced to simple, coherent ideologies. Still, if we treat “populism” and
“progressivism” as ideal types,6 a revealing pattern emerges.
Both populists and progressives worry about the interaction between markets and public power,
but their focus differs. Speaking very broadly, the populist impulse locates the source of economic
oppression in government corruption. According to this story, corrupt politicians have handed out
special privileges to private interests who have used their authority to create monopoly power and to
suppress small-scale enterprise. The solution to this problem is direct, popular democracy, which will
prevent plutocratic government capture.7

4

See Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “CMS Office of the Actuary releases 2017-2026
Projections of National Health Expenditures” at https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-officeactuary-releases-2017-2026-projections-national-health-expenditures. (projecting that health share of GDP will
rise from 17.9 percent in 2016 to 19.7 percent by 2026).
5
Sanders’ positions might be reconciled if one read him to favor Medicare for all only after our politics was
cleansed of the corrupting influence of wealth. Many things not now possible might become possible after a
millennial transformation. But nothing in Sanders’ rhetoric or actions suggests that he favors this sequential
approach. He appears to believe that Medicare has been a success in an era when the government was under the
control of the “billionaire class” and to favor Medicare for all in the here-and-now.
6
Cf. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 Yale. L.J. 1935, 1944 (1995)
(treating populist and progressive constitutional sensibilities as ideal types).
7
See pp xx-xx, infra.
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In contrast, the progressive impulse tends to locate the source of economic oppression in the
malfunction of private markets. According to this story, private individuals use markets to help
themselves and inflict injury on others. The solution to this problem is government regulation by elite
experts shielded from direct popular control.8
Because these two positions are hard to reconcile, and because both positions are embedded in
the DNA of modern liberalism, liberals are often inconsistent. Sanders speaks as a populist when he
complains about the billionaire party; he speaks as a progressive when he advocates Medicare for all;
and he speaks as a liberal when he fails to notice the tension between these two views.
This contradiction at the core of modern liberalism deserves more sustained attention than it
has received from historians and political theorists. It suggests why Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump
or, in an earlier age, Robert Kennedy and George Wallace enjoyed overlapping support. It hints at what
might be “the matter with Kansas”9 and helps explain why strands of leftist thinking overlap with
libertarian ideology, supposedly the antagonist of left. More broadly, it helps elucidate the failures and
frustrations of the moderate left.
I will have more to say about the contradiction in general, but this article’s principal focus is on a
particular branch of the contradiction that relates to civil liberties and constitutional interpretation. My
thesis is that the populist/progressive split explains much that is otherwise mysterious in modern
constitutional argument. Within this domain, however, the dispute between populists and progressives
plays out in some unexpected and counterintuitive ways.
One might expect populist distrust of government to translate into a constitutional stance
supportive of civil liberties, minority rights, and limited government. If the rich inevitably control the
levers of power, the sensible response is to utilize the Constitution to protect individuals from
8
9

See pp xx-xx, infra.
See Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (2007).
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government encroachment. Conversely, one might expect progressive faith in government to translate
into civil liberties skepticism. In a world where the government is a force for social justice, it makes no
sense to empower courts to obstruct its work.
There are strands of both populism and progressivism that cohere with this narrative. Populists
occasionally invoked civil liberties, as when, for example, they defended the right of Coxey’s Army to
assemble10 or attacked the use of military force against the Pullman strike.11 At least at some points in
its history, populism also made efforts to establish common ground with racial minorities.12
However, populists are better known for disparaging or disregarding civil liberties. There is
more than a hint of antisemitism and racism in some populist rhetoric.13 Populists were also more
sympathetic to government intervention than one might expect. Although many populists tried to tie
the movement to Jeffersonian democracy, they nonetheless favored an expansive view of congressional
powers that would, for example, lead to public ownership of railroads and means of communication.14

10

See John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party (1961)
(detailing populist support for Coxey’s Army).
11
See id. (detailing populist criticism of President Cleveland for using military in Pullman Strike).
12
See generally Joseph Gerteis, Class and the Color Line: Interracial Class Coalition in the Knights of Labor
and the Populist Movement ( 2017). See also Lawrence C. Goodwyn, Populist Dreams and Negro Rights: East
Texas as a Case Study, 76 Am. Hist. Rev. 1435, 1436 (1971) (case study of populism in Grimes County, Texas shows
that it was based on a “black-white collation that had its genesis in Reconstruction and endured for more than a
generation”); John A. Powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 Law and Ineq. 355 ,
375-77 (2007) (“In the early expression of the Populist movement, it was the southern White populist leadership
that realized the need for multiracial coalitions in order to succeed”). But cf. Sheryll D. Cashin, Democracy, Race,
and Multiculturalism in the Twenty-first Century: Will the Voting Rights Act Ever Be Obsolete?, 22 Wash. U. J. L. &
Pol’y 71, 82 (2006) (“In the end, any possibilities for a sustained, interracial political alliance were defeated by
exploiting whites’ fear of being dominated by Negroes”).
13
See, e.g., Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History 10 (2017) (quoting populist Tom
Watson’s complaining that red-eyed Jewish millionaires had become the chiefs of the Democratic Party); Lawrence
Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America 325 (1976) (some Populist
leaders became white supremacists).
14
See id. at 319 & n.* (populists sympathetic to Jefferson, but unlike Jefferson, were not dedicated to small
government); Thomas Goebel, The Political Economy of American Populism from Jackson to the New Deal, 11
Studies in Amer. Pol. Dev. 109, 122 (1997) (noting that populists favored regulation of railroads due to perception
that they were “government-sponsored monopolies”).
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Conversely, as one might expect, early progressives tended toward civil liberties skepticism and
were sometimes unsympathetic to minority rights.15 They were especially hostile to judicial review that
limited government power.16 Some progressives – Felix Frankfurter, for example – insisted on deference
toward the political branches in civil liberties cases well into the mid-twentieth century.17
But at least since the New Deal revolution, many progressives have embraced causes like free
speech, abortion rights, Fourth Amendment rights, and judicially enforced gender and racial equality.18
Even as they have trusted government when it intervenes in economic affairs, they have adopted a
posture of distrust regarding matters like the regulation of speech, search and seizure law, and statutes
limiting sexual and reproductive freedom.
What explains this disjunction? No one explanation fits all the facts, but in this article, I
emphasize a particular source for the paradox: populists and progressives had different views about
public corruption, and these different views produced counterintuitive positions with regard to civil
liberties and minority rights. Progressives were believers in progress, science, and rationalism. As
already noted, they favored a strong government run by experts who would rationalize and equalize
private markets.19 The corruption that they feared was the contamination of that expertise by ignorant
and prejudiced mass opinion. What they labeled as protection for minorities was often in fact
15

See David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in
American History, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 47, 53 (1992) (describing progressive ambivalence toward free speech prior to
World War I); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 951, 958-63 (1996)
(same); David W. Southern, The Progressive Era and Race: Reaction and Reform, 1900-1917(2005) (describing
progressive racism).
16
See, generally, William G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives and Labor Unions Confront the
Courts, 1890-1937 (1994).
17
See, e.g. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the
judgment) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to conviction of leaders of the Communist Party for advocating
forceful overthrow of the government); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) (rejecting application
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).
18
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising the Progressive State, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1063, 1064-65 (2016)
(noting that progressives favor “deferential judicial review” of economic legislation but “harsher review of
provisions that adversely affect underrepresented minorities or impair the practice of fundamental rights’).
19
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, note x, supra, at 1064-65 (identifying progressivism with use of scientific
evidence, commitment to nonmarket institutions, and policy making by government agencies).
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institutionalized protection for government against the threat posed by an unschooled populace. In that
sense, progressive support for what they called “civil liberties” was consistent with their progovernment stance.
In contrast, populism was often rooted in nostalgia for the past rather than hope for the
future.20 Populist politicians typically represented constituents whose culture and livelihood were
endangered by rapid economic and social change.21 Distrust of the rationalistic, elite opinion that drove
that change produced a different and less familiar, if no less vibrant, version of civil liberties. The
corruption that they feared was elite government control that led to the oppression of ordinary people
by “their betters.”22 In that sense, populist distrust of the progressive view of “civil liberties” was
consistent with their distrust of government.
All of this would be of no more than historical interest but for its impact on modern, liberal
constitutionalism. For the most part, liberals are heirs to the progressive tradition. When Bernie
Sanders argues for “Medicare for all,” he imagines a system run by apolitical civil servants who will
rationalize our dysfunctional and unfair medical system. That image, in turn, supports a constitutional
stance that is supportive of the administrative state and of broad congressional power and dismissive of
localism and constitutional protection for a private sphere. But if progressives trust government, why
do they support civil liberties? Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the role of civil liberties in this world is
often to protect the government from corruption by supposedly ignorant and prejudiced popular

20

See Richard Hofstadter, note x. supra, at 23-59. Cf. William A. Galston, Antipluralism: The Populist Threat
to Liberal Democracy 4 (2018) (associating modern populism with longing “for an imagined past that insurgent
politicians promised to restore”). Populism also had a utopian strain that pointed in vague and sweeping terms to a
humane and just future, best exemplified by Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward (1888). But, as Bellamy’s title
suggests, hopes for the future were often grounded in a sense of loss in the present.
21
See note xx, supra.
22
Cf. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 Yale L. J. 1935, 1946 (1995)
(noting that populists believed that people wanted “to participate in government, but they [did] not wish to be
manipulated and shaped by some master plan for effective governance. They want the opportunity to have a say
in what affects them, but they also wish to be allowed to live their lives, raise their children, and pursue their own
vision of happiness . . . free from the hand of bureaucratic planning, or corporate overreaching”).
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majorities. Hence, liberals tend to favor a version of civil liberties that promotes elite positions like
opposition to religious fundamentalism and to government suppression of academic and literary speech.
But Sanders and other modern liberals can’t quite shake their populist roots. Their support for a
powerful government rests uneasily with the residual fear of special interest capture. Even as they
worry about mass prejudice and intolerance, they maintain a residual affection for the cleansing power
of popular democracy. When liberals think like populists, their support for civil liberties translates into
opposition to elite dictation. The result is a version of civil liberties that is hostile to judicial power,
worries about agency capture, and supports a right to vote, a right to a basic income, and a right to be
free from government surveillance and harassment.
This formulation represents a substantial departure from the standard – some would say tired -story about our constitutional disagreements. The standard story treats the New Deal as a pivot point,
marking a transition from a suddenly discredited jurisprudence resting on classical legal thought to a
new world that had to contend with and domesticate the insights drawn from legal realism. On this
telling, in the wake of Lochner’s demise, some justices on the Roosevelt Court opted for judicial
restraint, while others embraced a version of judicial review that ignored economic rights but protected
civil liberties, political rights, and “discrete and insular minorities.” 23 In complex ways and for
complicated reasons, that division eventually morphed into a dispute between originalism and living
constitutionalism.
Of course, this story tells us things that are useful to know. It is not the whole story, though,
and it leaves some important things unexplained. For example, it fails to explain how conservatives
have successfully coopted populist constitutionalism and turned it into a mass movement centered on
deregulation. It does not explain why progressive constitutionalists found it necessary somehow to
23

See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 69-113 (rev.ed. 2000); Morton Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law: 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 9-63 (1992).

8
reconcile libertarian views with regard to certain individual rights with a faith in government regulation
with regard to everything else. It fails to explain why Bernie Sanders is confused. My hope for this
article is that a different way of organizing our constitutional experience will yield different insights and
explanations that provide an alternative account of our current dilemmas and controversies.
Part I sets the stage for this account by explaining the way in which I use the labels “populist”
and “progressive.” These labels are tied to historical events occurring in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. As used here, though, the labels are meant to identify sensibilities and tendencies
that transcend the events that gave rise to the labels.
With this definitional work completed, I begin the story in Part II. Because the story itself is
nonstandard, it has a nonstandard starting point. On this account, in the beginning there was not John
Marshall’s confrontation with Thomas Jefferson, enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments, the
court packing episode, or the NAACP’s campaign against racial subordination. Instead, the story begins
with two dramatic historical events that illustrate the tension between populist and progressive
constitutionalism: The Scopes Monkey trial of 1925, where a court found a school teacher guilty of the
“crime” of teaching evolution, and the Supreme Court’s decision two years later in Buck v. Bell,24 where
the justices allowed the sterilization of a young woman under a eugenics-inspired statute.
In the popular imagination, the Scopes trial is a morality play pitting know-nothing religious
prejudice against modern science and oppressive state orthodoxy against individual freedom. Buck, part
of our anti-canon, is often characterized in a similar fashion. On this version, Carrie Buck’s individual
rights were sacrificed on the altar of government prejudice and ignorance.
I argue that this conventional account misses a larger point. An alternative historical
construction makes Justice Holmes’ majority opinion in Buck and Clarence Darrow’s defense of Scopes

24

274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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into symbols of the progressive view of civil liberties, which sees the primary threat as government
capitulation in the face of uninformed and unintelligent mass opinion. On this telling, William Jennings
Bryan’s defense of the Tennessee anti-evolution statute and Carrie Buck’s tragic fate symbolize the
competing, populist view of civil liberties, which sees the very existence of “ordinary people” as
threatened by elite oppression.
Part III explores the way in which the argument between populists and progressives, illustrated
by the Scopes and Buck controversies, continued in their immediate aftermath. On standard accounts, 25
modern constitutionalism grows out of the court-packing controversy and the Supreme Court’s iconic
footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products.26 Instead, I emphasize two cases that reinterpret
Scopes and Buck. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,27 populists and progressives were able to unite around the
outcome when the Court invalidated a eugenics program on equal protection grounds, but the
argument resumed when the Court turned to compulsory flag salutes in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.28
Part IV extends the argument into the modern period and discusses how it has influenced
disputes about prayer in schools, racial justice, reproductive rights, free speech law, reapportionment,
and criminal procedure.
Part V discusses internal contradictions in both the populist and progressive traditions. Briefly
stated, the problem for populists is explaining how economic oppression could possibly be remedied
without systematic government intervention. This problem left populists vulnerable to a conservative
take-over that recast populist insights into a deregulatory program. The problem for progressives is

25
26
27
28

See note x, supra.
United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
Skinner v. Sate of Okl. Ex re. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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explaining how elite control of government could be reconciled with the interests of ordinary people.
This problem left progressives isolated and vulnerable when attacked by rightwing populists.
Part VI concludes by asking what steps we might take to resolve the contradictions that have
produced Bernie’s confusion.
I. Populists and Progressives
This is not the place for an extended historical examination of the populist and progressive
movements as they played out in the United States. Historians continue to argue about the aims,
composition, and character of these movements, and I am hardly in a position to contribute, much less
resolve these disagreements. In truth, like all political movements, populism and progressivism were
amorphous and contradictory. 29 Even the participants in the movements were uncertain about their
meaning and scope. For the most part, these participants were not political philosophers. Their
responses were determined more by the pressure of immediate events than by a worked out political
theory. While there is undoubtedly a “there there,” its boundaries are uncertain and contested.
For these reasons, it is important to guard against essentialism and oversimplification. That
said, there is also a risk that runs in the opposite direction. Yes, individual advocates of populism and
progressivism were complex bundles of sometimes contradictory ideas. Still, one cannot even begin to
talk about the ideas, much less the contradictions within them, without organizing them in some formal,
necessarily overly simple fashion. Of course, other organizations are possible, but some organization is
necessary and all organizations are vulnerable to the charge of essentialism.

29

See, e.g., Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction 2 (2017)
(noting that populism “truly is an essentially contested concept”); Norman Pollack, The Just Polity: Populism, Law,
and Human Welfare (1987) (characterizing populism as “a remarkably varied movement” and arguing that “[t]he
conventional wisdom about its nature can be contradicted at every turn”).
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For my argument to go through, then, it is necessary that the competing sensibilities that I
identify are at least loosely tied to historical events and movements, but the argument does not depend
on whether any particular person who identified herself as a populist or progressive actually held all the
views that I ascribe to the movements. In what follows, I use some particular actors and particular
historical events – what these actors said and did – to illustrate and dramatize my point. The point
stands, though, even if the actual history is much messier and more complicated than this account
suggests. What ultimately matters is that the competing sensibilities I describe once existed, that they
exist today, and that they help to explain some of the problems that we currently face.
In the two parts that follow, I describe these competing sensibilities to which, perhaps by
stipulation, I assign the labels “populist” and “progressive.”
A. Populists
The populist movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a rural, agrarian
revolt that grew out of a set of historical circumstances – in particular, the deflationary policies pursued
by the federal government after the Civil War,30 rapid industrialization, the rise of “big business” and the
corporate structure, widespread corruption in government, and the decline of the cultural hegemony of
rural America.31

30

See Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America 8-19

(1978).
31

See Goebels, note 12, supra; Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian
Revolt in America 3-93 (1978); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 7 (1955) (associating populism with the
rapid decline of rural America). Cf. Cas Mudde & Cristobal Rovira Kalwasser, “Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A
Framework for Analysis” in Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? 3 (2012)
(asserting that a “commonality” of populist movements was “an agrarian programme in which the peasantry was
seen as the main pillar of both society and economy.”)
For a discussion of American populism’s roots in the ante bellum period, see Michael Kazin, The Populist
Persuasion in American Politics 9-25 (2017). For discussions of populism as an international phenomenon, see,
e.g., Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Correction for Democracy? (Cas Mudde & Cristobal Rovira
Kaltwasser, eds. 2012).
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Although these events occurred in a particular time and place, they produced a sensibility that
transcends these particularities. It is marked by a nostalgia for a partially imagined and rapidly receding
past32 and an anger at the people who are destroying this golden age.33 The anger, in turn, expresses
itself in a Manichean view of politics. On one side are “the people” – an undifferentiated mass that is
good and noble and that has common interests and views. On the other side are “the interests” – a
small minority in control of the government and the culture that is determined to oppress the people in
order to achieve its own, selfish objectives.34
What was the remedy for these problems? Because the interests have corrupted the
government, some solutions involve self-help and localism.35 The Grange Movement and the growth of
farmer cooperatives reflect this impulse. In part, though, and in tension with their views about
government corruption, many populists favored strong government action like the nationalization of the
railroads and means of communication. The tension was partially resolved by their commitment to
direct popular democracy – measures like the referendum, initiative, and recall.36 Because the
government had been corrupted by the interests, and because the people are “good,” the people must

32

See note 19, supra.
Id. at 13-14.
34
See, e.g., id. at 36 (asserting that populists distinguish between the “people” and the “elites,” with each
group treated as homogeneous and the two interests fundamentally opposed); Cas Mudde & Cristoball Rovira
Kalwasser, note x., supra, at 8 (asserting that “every manifestation of populism criticizes the existence of powerful
minorities, which in one way or another are obstructing the will of the common people”). Cf. Michael Kazin, The
Populist Persuasion: An American History 31 (rev.ed. 2017) (“With privilege now resting securely in the saddle,
[populist] literature of reform bristled with narratives of degeneration, conspiracy, and betrayal.”)
35
See, e.g., Norman Pollack, note x, supra, at 108 (1987) (Noting that populists favored abolition of
“[s]pecial advantages conferred by the state,” but that “the purpose of removing obstructions was to throw
individuals on their own mettle.”)
36
See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, note xx, supra at 1945 (noting
that populists favored “regular rotations of positions of authority and power” and “popular participation in
economic and political structures that affect the lives of ordinary citizens”). On populist ambivalence about strong
government, see Michael Kazin, note x, supra, at 41-42.
33
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seize control of governmental power. They can do so by direct action that will displace the
compromised politicians administering a plutocracy.37
Although populists regularly lost national elections, they are widely credited with achieving
important reforms. The movement also had a downside, however. The Manichean mindset left
populists vulnerable to conspiracy theories, some of which were quite bizarre. Moreover, despite what
populists said, “the people” are not, in fact, an undifferentiated mass. In order to make their ideology
work, the theory had to identify “the people” with some people. That tendency, when combined with a
conspiratorial mindset, sometimes led to antisemitism, xenophobia, and racism that tarnished the
movement.38
B. Progressives
There is considerable overlap between the populist and progressive movements. Both were
founded in part on status anxiety, and the movements often shared similar aims. For our purposes,
though, it is important to emphasize the differences.
Whereas populists were worried about the decline of rural America, progressives tended to be
middle or even upper class and urban. They felt themselves squeezed between the influx of immigrants
“corrupting” urban government on the one hand and the growth of newly wealthy “captains of
industry” on the other. Against these forces, progressives imagined themselves as sensible centrists
who could be neutral arbiters between working class radicalism and heartless plutocracy.39 Whereas

37

See id., at 5, 8 (arguing that populists “viewed the political economy as a system of emergent monopolism
that had . . . denied the autonomous existence of the state as the custodian of individual security and the nation’s
welfare” and that populists thought that the solution to this problem was “an alternation of values and social
relations, the formation of a public standard, and the redistribution of power” that would nonetheless leave
private property in place).
38
See Richard Hofstader, note x, supra, at 61; William A. Galston, Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to
Liberal Democracy 65 (2018).
39
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 163 (1955) (characterizing eastern progressivism as “a mild and
judicious movement, whose goal was not a sharp change in the social structure, but rather the formation of a
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populists were nostalgic for a lost past, progressives thought that they could lead the country toward a
sensible and humane future.40
Progressives were much less drawn to conspiracy theories than populists, and they were
therefore less concerned with an imagined world-wide force that had taken control of government. For
many progressives, government was the solution rather than the problem. Government could be the
agent of the moderate reform that they favored, but in order to accomplish this reform, it had to be
populated by fair minded experts.41 Direct popular control often obstructed the ability of these
technocrats to do their work.42 Public opinion was often fickle, uninformed, and prejudiced.43
Regulators needed to be at least partially shielded from popular control lest they lose their neutrality
and their ability to pursue solutions that were complex rather than simple.44
Like populism, progressivism both produced important reforms and was tarnished by important
weaknesses. Progressives succeeded in actually utilizing the levers of government power to produce a
more just polity. Like the populists, however, their concern about the changing demographics of the

responsible elite, which was to take charge of the popular impulse toward change and direct it into moderate and,
as they would have said, ‘constructive’ channels’”); Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion, note x, supra, at 51
(asserting that progressives “sought to harmonize . . . legitimate but partial interests for the sake of the larger
‘public interest’”).
40
See, e.g., id., at 148-64.
41
See, id., at 155 (“The development of regulative and humane legislation required the skills of lawyers and
economists, sociologists and political scientists, in the writing of laws and in the staffing of administrative and
regulative bodies.”)
42
Cf. William A. Galston, Anti-Pluralism, note xx, supra, at 4 (noting that elitist “efforts to insulate
themselves from the people – in the quasi-invisible civil service, in remote bureaucracies, in courts and
international institutions – inevitably breed resentment”).
43
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country sometimes led to xenophobia and racism.45 Moreover, the progressive impulse to depoliticize
public policy tended to produce a blindness about good faith moral disagreement. Some progressives
smugly assumed that their positions were value-free and “scientific” and that opposing views were
ignorant and prejudiced.46 Whereas populists were, perhaps, unduly pessimistic about the extent of
government corruption by the interests, progressives were unduly ingenuous about problems of agency
capture and interest group control.
How did these competing sensibilities influence the development of modern constitutional law?
That is the subject of the next Parts. The story might be recounted abstractly and generally. Instead, I
relate it in the context of a few specific and dramatic historical events and court decisions.
II. Of Monkeys and Imbeciles: Evolution, Eugenics, and the Meaning of Civil Liberties
A. The Showdown in Dayton
Part publicity stunt, part morality play, part farce, and part deadly serious cultural battle, the
Scopes Monkey Trial commands our attention almost a century after its inconclusive end.
The trial was originally the brainchild of community leaders in the small town of Dayton,
Tennessee. They had little ideological interest in either evolution or biblical literalism. Instead, their
objectives were secular. They thought that a “test case” involving the state’s new statute prohibiting
publicly funded schools from teaching “any theory that denies the Story of the Divine Creation of man as
taught in the Bible,” would spark much-needed economic activity.47 At the beginning, everyone
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understood that there would be no hard feelings.48 John Scopes, himself, may never have taught
evolution49 and openly cooperated with the prosecution so as to put on a good show.50
Things changed when, over the opposition and doubts of some of the original participants,51
William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow arrived on the scene. Bryan was a hero to many populists.
He had run for president three times and served as Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of state, but was now
retired from politics.52 He nonetheless retained a huge following and had spent years of his life
campaigning against evolutionary theory and arguing for laws that prohibited the teaching of the theory
in public schools.53 Darrow, the most famous trial lawyer of his time, had prevailed in many seemingly
hopeless cases. He was a tireless defender of labor and of radicalism and a notorious religious skeptic
and advocate of material determinism.54
When these two giants showed up, the case turned into a media circus climaxed by Darrow’s
dramatic decision to call Bryan himself to the stand as an expert on the Bible. In the suffocating heat,
Darrow mercilessly badgered Bryan about biblical literalism. A huge throng watched on an outdoor
platform, where the trial had been moved for fear that the courtroom floor would collapse. Millions
more followed the trial through a primitive radio hook up and the print media. The jury’s guilty verdict,
reached after only minutes of deliberation, was anticlimactic, but high drama returned when Bryan died
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suddenly a few days after the trial. By the time the episode concluded, it had become the stuff of
American legend.55
The legend has tended to obscure what was actually at stake in the case. On one level, the
answer is not much. Even after Darrow and Bryan became involved, there were many indications that
the participants were not playing for keeps. There was never a risk that Scopes would be incarcerated
or even lose his job.56 Bryan, who had always opposed attaching penalties to antievolution statutes,
graciously offered to pay Scopes’ modest fine.57 Even had he lived, Bryan would not have had to make
good on the offer because the Tennessee Supreme Court found a technicality that allowed it to reverse
the jury’s verdict.58 The court urged the prosecution not to retry the case,59 and the prosecutors
promptly acquiesced.60
The absence of the high personal stakes that often accompany criminal trials only serves to
emphasize the symbolic stakes. But what, exactly, were those stakes? Two related conventional
accounts do not quite fit the facts.
On the first view, Bryan and Darrow symbolize religious ignorance and obscurantism pitted
against free inquiry and scientific rationalism. This is the way that H.L. Menken characterized the trial in
his famous dispatches from Dayton61 and how Frederick Lewis Allen presented the case in his best-
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selling book published six years after the trial.62 It was the dramatic focal point for Inherit the Wind, the
Broadway play and movie based on the trial. It was how Darrow himself meant to frame the
controversy when his examination of Bryan revealed Bryan’s scientific illiteracy and the absurdities
produced by biblical literalism.63
Unfortunately, though, this framing oversimplifies the controversy. Consider first, the
“scientific” basis for Darrow’s position. If not still in its infancy, evolutionary biology was undergoing a
turbulent adolescence in 1925. Its scientific status was contested and shaky.64 Evolutionists themselves
were divided between Darwinian and Lamarckian versions,65 and the Lamarckian theory, still endorsed
by important scientists in 1925, was more compatible with biblical literalism.66 There remained
important holes in the Darwinian account for which there were not yet adequate explanations.67
It gets worse. Perhaps the most important archeological evidence in support of Darwinian
theory was the Piltdown Man, discovered some thirty miles from Darwin’s home in 1909 on the fiftieth
anniversary of the publication of Origin of Species. The discovery was hailed by the leading experts on
human development.68 According to the highly regarded biologist Boyd Dawkins, “The evidence was
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clear that this discovery revealed a missing link between man and the higher apes.”69 Paleontologist
Arthur Smith Woodward of the British Museum stated that “the Piltdown skull representing a hitherto
unknown human species, is the missing link[.] I for one, have not the slightest doubt. . . . [W]e came
from a species almost entirely ape.”70 In a debate with Bryan three years before the Scopes Trial, Henry
Fairfield Osborne, the President of the American Museum of Natural History, relied on the discovery to
refute Bryan’s claim that evolutionary theory was unproved.71
It should come as no surprise, then, that when Darrow submitted affidavits of leading scientists
to the Scopes court in support of evolutionary theory, some of them relied heavily on the Piltdown
discovery.72 There was only one problem: Years later, investigators revealed that The Piltdown Man
was a crude fake, produced by burying together a human skull, the jaw of an orangutan, and
chimpanzee teeth.73 When it came to Piltdown, it turned out to be conservative Christians who asked
the skeptical questions and much of the scientific establishment that was guilty of ingenuous faith.
If Darrow’s claim to speak for science was exaggerated, so too was the assertion that Bryan was
the voice of mindless biblical literalism. No doubt, Bryan believed biblical accounts of miracles that
cannot be explained by modern science,74 but at a crucial stage of Darrow’s examination, he conceded
that at least some biblical passages should be read figuratively75 and even managed to joke about
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biblical literalism.76 At many other points in the examination, he commendably refused to express an
opinion without studying the matter in greater detail.77
On a broader level, much of Bryan’s opposition to evolution was political rather than
theological. Of course, his Christian faith was important to him, but he was never a “fundamentalist” in
the usual sense of the word. His religion was instrumental. Christianity was important because he saw
it as supporting the political commitments that had shaped his adult life: The insistence on individual
dignity and on the necessity of taking seriously the needs and beliefs of ordinary people.78 For Bryan,
mechanistic and deterministic evolutionary theory put these commitments at risk, especially in an
environment where opponents of these commitments were using “survival of the fittest” to justify
laissez faire economics.
A second characterization of the Dayton trial pits Bryan’s majoritarianism against Darrow’s
defense of individual rights. This was the way that Bryan himself sometimes described the stakes. He
repeatedly and eloquently defended the rights of communities to decide for themselves what was
taught in their own public schools.79 On the other side, it was also the way that the American Civil
Liberties Union, and its representative in Dayton, Arthur Garfield Hays, saw the case. According to this
characterization, John Scopes represented free thought, inquiry, and expression – the freedom to resist
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majority pressure in the name of individual autonomy.80 On this view, it was Darrow, rather than Bryan,
who was the supporter of dignity and freedom.
For both sides, this characterization had the advantage of bracketing explosive issues about the
truth of evolutionary theory on the one hand and of biblical accounts on the other. Bryan could claim
that, whatever one made of the Bible’s creation story, communities had the right to decide for
themselves what their children should be taught. Similarly, Hays could argue that the right of selfexpression should not be held hostage to majority beliefs whether or not those beliefs were accurate.
This characterization also fit awkwardly with the positions taken by each side. There is no doubt
that Bryan’s majoritarianism was sincere, but there is good reason to doubt that it provided his primary
motivation. It is hard to imagine that he would have traveled hundreds of miles and spent weeks in
unbearable summer heat to defend the right of a popularly elected school board to mandate the
teaching of evolutionary theory.
Hays’ individual rights stance provides an even more procrustean fit with the ACLU’s actual
position. It is deeply implausible that opponents of the Tennessee statute really believed that individual
school teachers had the right to teach whatever they wanted to school children. No one claimed that a
school board had to permit teachers to tell their students that mathematics was the work of the devil or
that communism is the best form of government.
When antievolutionists began to lose the culture war, they started to cloak their argument in
the very individual rights claims that Hays and the ACLU had made earlier. Why not present both sides
and give teachers and students the intellectual freedom to decide the controversy for themselves, they
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argued.81 When the Supreme Court finally entered the fray, the justices instead bought the argument
advanced by the ACLU82 that public schools could not ban the teaching of Darwinian theory83 and must
ban the teaching of creationism even if coupled with the teaching of Darwinian theory.84 It turned out
that the ACLU’s “civil liberties” position was not about freedom of speech at all, but about the primacy
of evolutionary theory.
If the standard accounts of the Dayton confrontation are wrong, then what was it that
generated the undeniable emotion that accompanied the trial? The real stakes are dramatically
illustrated by the emotional climax of Darrow’s cross examination of Bryan:
The Witness [Bryan]-These gentlemen have not had much chance-they did not come here to try this case.
They came here to try revealed religion. I am here to defend it, and they can ask me any question they
please.
The Court-All right.
(Applause from the court yard.)
Mr. Darrow-Great applause from the bleachers.
The Witness-From those whom you call "yokels."
Mr. Darrow-I have never called them yokels.
The Witness-That is the ignorance of Tennessee, the bigotry.
Mr. Darrow-You mean who are applauding you?
(Applause.)
The Witness-Those are the people whom you insult.
Mr. Darrow-You insult every man of science and learning in the world because he does not believe in your
fool religion. 85
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As this exchange illustrates, the real dispute was not about majority rule or scientific
rationalism. It was about the conflict between progressive and populist versions of civil liberties. Both
scientific rationalism and majority rule had something to do with the argument, but only in an indirect
fashion. For progressives, “civil liberties” was about protecting government from the influence of a
biased and ignorant populace and their “fool religion.” Scientific rationalism related to this claim, but
only because it was part of the belief system of elites. For populists, collective self-determination was
not ultimately about government power, but about shielding powerless “ordinary” people from elite
denigration – from being labeled as “yokels.” Majoritarianism related to this claim, but only because it
was sometimes instrumentally useful in providing this shield.
In order to see the way in which the dispute played out, we need to compare the Dayton trial
with a second, less famous dispute that reached the Supreme Court two years later.
B. Preventing the Unfit from Continuing Their Kind
A few months before the Dayton trial, another trial court convened to adjudicate another test
case in another southern, rural community – in this case, Amherst County, Virginia.86 Although there
was none of the hoopla or press coverage that marked the Bryan-Darrow confrontation, the trial in
Amherst County was also mostly for show. Counsel for the respondent was a long-time friend and
supporter of the petitioner and put up only token opposition to the petitioner’s case.87 The result was
again a foregone conclusion, and, as in Dayton, the purpose of the trial was to establish a broader point
only tangentially related to the personal interests of the participants. But whereas the personal stakes
for John Scopes were negligible, the stakes for Carrie Buck – the eighteen-year-old Amherst County
respondent – were huge. Her loss, ultimately ratified in a notorious opinion written by Oliver Wendell
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Holmes, Jr. for the United States Supreme Court,88 resulted in compelled surgery that permanently
deprived her of the ability to give birth.
The Amherst County trial grew out of a eugenics craze that engulfed the country in the early
twentieth century.89 At the height of craze, Virginia enacted a statute that permitted the forced
sterilization of individuals found to be “afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity that are recurrent,
idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness or epilepsy.”90 By 1931, 28 states had enacted similar statutes
authorizing eugenic sterilization91 and, as we shall see, laws along these lines had been endorsed by the
leading jurists in the United States.92
Carrie Buck was an early victim of the craze. She was the descendant of destitute farmers who
had been forced off the land, the sort of people who might have supported William Jennings Bryan’s
presidential campaigns.93 Her mother’s economic difficulties made it hard to care for the child, and she
was taken in by John and Alice Dobbs, who treated her as a servant.94 When she became pregnant as a
result of being raped by Alice’s nephew, the Dobbs filed a petition to commit her to the Colony for
Epileptics and Feeble-Minded.95 Buck had been a good student, and there is little or no evidence that
she suffered from mental deficiencies.96 Despite this fact, the judge granted the Dobbs’ petition.97
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When the head of the Colony was looking for a test case to establish the constitutional validity
of Virginia’s new eugenics statute, he selected Buck.98 After she lost at trial and in the United States
Supreme Court, she was involuntarily sterilized99 and, eventually, released from custody.100 People who
knew her late in life had no doubt about her intelligence. One visitor found her reading the newspaper
daily and “joining a more literate friend to assist at regular bouts with the crossword puzzles.” The
visitor reported that Buck was “not a sophisticated woman, and lacked social graces,” but that “she was
neither mentally ill nor retarded.”101
The eugenics fad resulted in personal tragedy for Carrie Buck and for many others, but for
purposes of this article, two more general facts about the movement merit attention. First, there was a
direct connection between eugenics and Darwinism. The connection was not inevitable. Evolution
operates without human intervention. Conservatives therefore might have treated it as allied with a
laissez-faire economic and social approach. Eugenics, in contrast, involved extensive and, by modern
lights, extreme government intervention.102
There is another sense, though, in which eugenicists and evolutionists were natural allies.
Because evolution is a random process that affected humans, other animals, and plants alike, it
suggested to some that there was nothing special about humans and no intrinsic meaning to their
existence. If that was true, then it might be thought to follow that there was nothing wrong with human
intervention in the evolutionary process. Because intrinsic human dignity was not a concern, there was
no reason to oppose manipulation of the gene pool in order to accomplish the social ends that
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progressives favored. Indeed, eugenics might supply meaning that random, undisturbed evolution
lacked.
Whether logical or not, there is no doubt that many early twentieth century advocates of
eugenics and evolution saw a connection. Charles Darwin, himself, understood the attraction of
eugenics. For example, he suggested that small-pox vaccinations were problematic because they
preserved people of “weak constitution.” The result, he wrote, “must be highly injurious to the race of
man.” For Darwin, though, “the noblest part of our nature” meant that “we must bear without
complaining the undoubtedly bad effects of the weak surviving and propagating their kind.”103
Many of Darwin’s supporters were uninhibited by these moral reservations. His half cousin,
Francis Galton, coined the word “eugenics” and produced “scientific” work linking Darwinian insights to
a program of promoting “the more suitable races or strains of blood . . . over the less suitable.”104
Darwin’s son, Leonard, was the president of the Eugenics Education Society.105 Ronald A. Fisher,
perhaps the leading evolutionary biologist in Europe, was motivated by the desire to prove the worth of
eugenics.106
Many evolutionary biologists in the United States held similar views. Although Darrow himself
was a strong opponent of eugenics,107 six of the experts that he summoned to support him in Dayton
had endorsed eugenics.108 The textbook from which John Scopes taught linked evolutionary theory to
eugenics and endorsed both.109 Scopes made a public appearance with Charles B. Davenport, one of the
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country’s leading eugenicist, who was also a fierce defender of evolutionary biology.110 Harry Laughlin, a
tireless campaigner for eugenic sterilization, held a doctorate in biology from Princeton.111 Every article
on eugenics published in medical journals between 1899 and 1912 favored sterilization.112
Conversely, much of the opposition to eugenics came from Christian opponents of Darwinism.
Bryan himself opposed evolutionary theory in part because it led to eugenic conclusions. 113 When
Nebraska’s governor vetoed a sterilization bill, he stated that the bill was “more in keeping with the
pagan age than with the teachings of Christianity,” and that “man is more than an animal.”114 Billy
Sunday, the leading evangelist of his day, insisted on a similar linkage. “Let your scientific consolation
enter a room where the mother has lost her child,” he said. “Try your doctrine of the survival of the
fittest. And when you have gotten through with your scientific, philosophical, psychological, eugenic,
social service, evolution, protoplasm and fortuitous concurrence of atoms, if she is not crazed by it, I will
go to her and after one-half hour of prayer and the reading of the Scripture promises, the tears will be
wiped away.”115
The second important fact about the eugenics movement was that it was largely a progressive
project.116 Theodore Roosevelt, the progressive hero of the Bull Moose campaign, was also the
country’s most famous advocate for eugenics. “Feeble minded persons,” he insisted, should be
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“forbidden to leave offspring behind them.”117 While serving as reform governor of New Jersey,
Woodrow Wilson, a strong supporter of eugenics, signed into law a statute permitting surgery on the
“feebleminded (including idiots, imbeciles, and morons), epileptics, rapists, certain criminals and other
defectives.”118 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the author of Buck v. Bell and long-time proponent of
eugenics,119 was also a progressive hero, although his relationship to the movement was complex and
ambivalent.120 The same could not be said of Louis Brandeis an unabashed progressive121 or of Harlan
Fiske Stone, who was rapidly moving toward progressive positions.122 Both joined Holmes’ opinion.
More broadly, eugenics fit seamlessly into a progressive program that emphasized rationality,
social hygiene, science, and the seemingly limitless potential for reform that could be produced by
intelligent use of government power to correct social ills.123 Of course, a strong current of racism and
xenophobia also ran through the eugenics movement. It was no coincidence that its triumphs came at a
time when there was growing panic about immigration and a change in the country’s ethnic mix.124 But
given this fact, it is all the more striking that eugenics never gained a foothold in the Deep South. The
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reason seems to be that progressive elitism was almost entirely a northern phenomenon. The eugenics
movement was populated by white, middle class, northern, and urban reformers who were also
attracted to progressivism. Where populism reigned, eugenics mostly failed.125
Given this association, it is easy to see why Carrie Buck’s case, like John Scopes’, pitted
progressive and populist versions of constitutionalism against each other. Figuring out what was at
stake in Buck’s case helps us see more clearly what was at stake in Dayton and what, precisely, the
difference between populists and progressives amounts to.
The starting point for this inquiry is a comparison between Holmes’ remarkable opinion and the
opinions that he might have written. Holmes might have written an opinion supporting Carrie Buck’s
claim on the ground that the Constitution protects minority rights. This is the Holmes of his famous
dissent in Abrams v. United States,126 where he warned that we should be “eternally vigilant against
attempts to check the expression of opinion that we loath.”127 It is also the way that Arthur Garfield
Hays characterized what was at stake in the Scopes trial.128
Alternatively, Holmes might have ruled in Buck’s favor on the ground that eugenics was “junk
science.” Although many contemporary scientists supported eugenics, there was enough contemporary
dissent to form the basis for doubt.129 In Dayton, Darrow argued against the unthinking acceptance of
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received wisdom.130 The Holmes of Abrams warned that “time has upset many fighting faiths.”131 The
Holmes of Buck might have directed some of his famous skepticism against the state’s case.
Finally, if Holmes was determined to rule against Buck, he might have done so on majoritarian
grounds. This stance would have aligned him with Bryan’s assertion in Dayton that, whether or not
biblical creation accounts were accurate, the people had the right to decide for themselves that they
wished to embrace it.132 This was also the Holmes of Lochner v. New York,133 when he confronted what
might be characterized as the economic version of eugenics. In that context, he wrote that “If it were a
question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making
up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.”134
Of course, Holmes wrote none of these opinions. After a brief and perfunctory obeisance
toward the principle of judicial deference,135 he wrote the following:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their
lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent
our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.136
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This is not the language of skepticism, of deference to majority judgments, or of civil liberties. It
is a full throated defense, on the merits, of the eugenics program.137 That defense is consistent with
broad strands in the progressive tradition that celebrated public policy produced by unsentimental,
rational, and clear-eyed balancing of costs and benefits. This posture leads naturally to a readiness to
override supposed individual rights in order to achieve the public good. It also lends itself to an
ingenuous acceptance of scientific expertise.
At first, though, Holmes’ rhetoric seems irreconcilable with the civil liberties position that Arthur
Garfield Hays advanced in Dayton, just as the progressive defense of civil liberties more generally seems
inconsistent with progressive faith in government power. In fact, the two positions can be reconciled,
but only in a way that is deeply unsettling.
The reconciliation cannot be achieved by reference to constitutionally imposed neutrality
between competing community norms -- that is, in the way that many modern liberals claim.138 As I
have already argued, it is very doubtful that the ACLU really favored a freedom of conscience that
permitted school teachers to teach children whatever the teachers happened to believe. The ACLU was
in favor of science, not freedom of conscience. Similarly, there was nothing “neutral” or respectful
toward competing communities in Holmes’ endorsement of eugenics. On the contrary, eugenics
threatened the very existence of communities that made progressives uncomfortable.139 Like
evolutionary theory, eugenics was attractive to progressives because it was “scientific” and rationalistic
and, therefore, in accord with the values of the particular community to which progressives belonged.
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A reconciliation between progressive support for civil liberties and progressive belief in
government power is possible only because of the persistent progressive tendency to confuse
progressive value judgments with neutral and universal truth.140 On this reconciliation, what civil
liberties actually amounted to was not immunity for individual conscience, but immunity for
government when it is threatened by unreasoned and biased mass opinion.
To understand how far progressives were willing to go in order to enforce that immunity, we
need to grasp the scope of the eugenics project that Buck v. Bell endorsed. A report funded by the
Carnage Institution suggested euthanasia as a method of dealing with disabled individuals.141 Harry
Laughlin, the head of the Eugenics Record Office and a leading spokesman for the movement, wrote
that the “lowest ten percent of the human stock are so meagerly endowed by Nature that their
perpetuation would constitute a social menace.”142 Intelligence tests administered to newly arrived
immigrants in 1913 found that 79 percent of Italians, 80 percent of Hungarians, 83 percent of Jews, and
87 percent of Russians were feebleminded.143 Tests administered to 1.75 million Army enlistees in 1917
found feeblemindedness in 47.3 percent.144 One leading eugenicist thought that it might be necessary
to sterilize some fifteen million people.145
In light of all this, it is easy to see why William Jennings Bryan thought that eugenics and the
evolutionary theory that buttressed it were an existential threat. The eugenics project was nothing less
than an attempt to extirpate the portion of the population most likely to be his supporters. The
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reasonableness of that fear, in turn, dissolves the tension between Bryan’s support for majoritarianism
during the Scopes trial and, had he lived, what undoubtedly would have been his support for individual
rights in the Buck case. The thread that connects the two positions is not a concern for either
majoritarianism or individual rights as we understand these concepts today, but rather a concern that
“ordinary people” in general will be belittled, subjugated, and, ultimately, eliminated by an arrogant and
heartless elite.
If this story is correct, then most people who have studied and participated in the last century’s
constitutional debate have misunderstood what is going on. Conventional accounts pit popular
sovereignty against individual rights. In this framing, courts are caught in a dilemma between the
argument for democratic self-rule and the argument for minority rights.146 That dilemma, in turn, is
supposedly resolved by justificatory theories premised on originalism,147 representation
reinforcement,148 moral philosophy,149 or common law constitutionalism.150
But this is not the best way to account for the actual behavior of progressives and populists.
Their actual behavior suggests that claims about democracy and individual rights were only
instrumentally useful and that methods of constitutional interpretation were epiphenomenal. The real
argument was between the empowerment of educated experts and of “ordinary people.” When
“experts” were in control of government, as they were when Virginia enacted its eugenics statute,
progressives favored majoritarianism and populists favor individual rights. When “ordinary people”
were in control, as they were when Tennessee enacted its anti-evolution statute, populists favored
majoritarianism and progressives favored individual rights.
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Because modern liberalism is an amalgam of populism and progressivism, liberal
constitutionalism reflects both positions. Seeing how this conflict played out is the work of the next two
Parts.
III. What Came Next
A. Eugenics
Buck v. Bell has never been overruled, and the Supreme Court continued to cite it into the
twenty-first century.151 America’s love affair with eugenics continued as well. Polls in the late 1930s
found that 84 percent of Americans favored sterilization of “habitual criminals and the hopelessly
insane.”152 In 1974, a federal judge found “uncontroverted evidence” that in the recent past “minors
and other incompetents have been sterilized with federal funds and that an indefinite number of poor
people have been improperly coerced into accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that
various federally supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible
sterilization.”153 As late as 2010, California was sterilizing large numbers of female prisoners without
their full consent.154
But although support did not die out, cultural and legal developments reversed the momentum
favoring eugenics. The cultural change resulted from popular revulsion with the Nazi eugenics
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program.155 A simultaneous legal change occurred in 1942 when the Supreme Court decided Skinner v.
Oklahoma.156 At issue was a state statute providing for involuntary sterilization of persons who had
committed three or more “felonies involving moral turpitude.” Justice Douglas’s opinion for the
majority cited Buck several times and purported to leave its holding intact.157 It nonetheless found that
the Oklahoma statute violated the equal protection clause because it excepted from its coverage
“offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political
offenses.”158
The first paragraph of Justice Douglas’ opinion, apparently added late in the drafting process,159
invoked neither the populist nor the progressive tradition. Instead it used the rhetoric of individual
rights. “This case touches a sensitive and important area of human rights,” Douglas wrote. “Oklahoma
deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race – the right to have
offspring.”160
But here, as in Scopes and Buck, we should not be misled by individual rights rhetoric. If the
“important” “right to have offspring” really had constitutional stature, then Buck would have been
overruled or, at least, sharply limited, and there would have been no need to resort to equal protection
analysis. Both the Virginia and Oklahoma statutes would have fallen because they violated a substantive
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constitutional norm.161 The question, then, is why the Court thought that the Skinner statute, but not
necessarily the Buck statute, was arbitrary.
To find the answer, we need to view the case through the prism of populist and progressive
constitutionalism. It turns out that whereas populists and progressives disagreed in Scopes and Buck,
they could join in an overlapping consensus in Skinner.
From the progressive point of view, an important change occurred between 1927 and 1942. In
large part because of the Nazis’ brutal experiment with eugenics, elite opinion had changed sides.162
Although eugenics remained popular among the populace as a whole, experts increasingly doubted
eugenic claims. 163 Academics now saw the program as thinly disguised racism based on myth and
pseudo-science in much the way that experts had denigrated biblical creation stories fifteen years
earlier in Dayton.164
There are hints throughout the Skinner litigation that the justices were influenced by this shift.
At oral argument, Chief Justice Stone asked skeptical questions about whether criminal traits were
subject to genetic transmission,165 and Justice Jackson asked whether environment, rather than genetics
produced crime.166 When Douglas came to write his opinion, he bracketed the argument that the
Oklahoma statute “cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power in view of the state of
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scientific authorities respecting inheritability of criminal traits,”167 but he nonetheless took the trouble
to cite seven studies suggesting that the eugenics argument was deeply flawed.168 And when he turned
to the equal protection analysis, he mocked Oklahoma’s claim that there was scientific evidence
supporting the notion that chicken thieves, but not embezzlers, had a genetic propensity to crime.169
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion expressed doubt about the effort “to sterilize the individual in
pursuit of a eugenic plan to eliminate from the race characteristics that are only vaguely identified and
which in our present state of knowledge are uncertain as to transmissibility.”170 Chief Justice Stone
based his concurrence on the failure of the state to provide a hearing to discover whether “[the
defendant’s] criminal tendencies are of an inheritable type.”171
In light of this shift in expert opinion, the progressive stance in Scopes, Buck and Skinner is
entirely consistent. In each case, progressives treated the Constitution as shielding government from
corruption produced by ignorant and prejudiced mass opinion. The fact that mass and elite opinion
about eugenics switched places between Buck and Skinner might have given more perceptive
progressives pause about their ingenuous faith in expertise. But because that faith remained unshaken,
progressives were willing to change their views to conform to a shift in the scientific consensus. 172
Because that consensus now condemned eugenics, preservation of government as the domain of
experts now required courts to condemn it as well.
That condemnation, standing alone, might have led to the outright overruling of Buck. But by
preserving Buck and shifting to an equal protection theory, Justice Douglas was able to make a second
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point, also in tension with an individual rights approach, but this time appealing to populists. For
populists, the shift from the substantive due process emphasis in Buck to an equal protection rationale
served to emphasize the class bias inherent in the eugenics project. No doubt because of the Nazi
experience, Douglas mentioned race and nationality rather than class. Still, the statutory distinctions
that he emphasized – between chicken thieves on the one hand and embezzlers and corrupt politicians
on the other – made the point about class distinctions clearly enough. “Strict scrutiny” he wrote, was
necessary “lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of
individuals in violation of the constitutionality of just and equal laws.”173 For populists, this language
could easily be read as endorsing the proposition that the life styles, customs, and beliefs of “ordinary
Americans” were not sources of shame and should not be the target of derision and condescension.
They were certainly not a cancer to be removed from the American body politic. Instead, they were
sources of pride to be valued and respected. Of course, and above all, that was the point that Bryan
wanted to make in Dayton and, indeed, throughout his public life.
B. Orthodoxy in Education
Just as Skinner required a reinterpretation of Buck, the Court’s decision a year later in West
Virginia Board of Education v Barnette174 required a reinterpretation of Scopes. But whereas Skinner
produced a populist/progressive détente, Barnette demonstrated that the conflict could not be resolved
permanently.
At issue was a school district’s expulsion of children who adhered to the Jehovah’s Witness faith
for refusal to participate in a flag salute ceremony. In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis,175 the Court had
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rejected a free exercise challenge to expulsions with only one dissent. A scant three years later, it
reversed itself and endorsed a free speech challenge to a similar measure in Barnette.
Justice Jackson’s opinion is famous for his powerful endorsement of individual rights, and Justice
Frankfurter’s lengthy and sprawling dissent rings all the changes of majoritarianism and judicial
restraint. Once again, though, one needs to look beneath the surface to find the issues that actually
divide the justices.
Consider, first, the Jackson opinion. In its most famous passages, Jackson proclaims that “One’s
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no election”176
and that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion.”177
This is strong rhetoric, but it presents two difficulties. First, the rhetoric conflicts with the more
general progressive position on government power. Jackson himself said as much. He conceded that
the principles he relied on “grew in a soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the
center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and
that government should be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s
affairs.”178 On Jackson’s account, this “laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has
withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.”179
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These musings amount to a remarkably (and in Jackson’s case characteristically) candid
acknowledgement of what in this context might be labeled “Bernie’s confusion.” Why should
progressives, who trust government power everywhere else, worry about it in this context?
The confusion is especially pronounced because Barnette dealt with school children, where
doubts about whether “liberty [is] attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints” are
most intense. Jackson must have understood that withdrawing government compulsion did not leave
the children free to decide for themselves whether to salute the flag. As Justice Frankfurter wrote in
Gobitis, the pledge might serve to “awaken in the child’s mind considerations as to the significance of
the flag contrary to those implanted by the parent.”180 Viewed from this angle, it is easy to see the
progressive point that state compulsion sometimes promotes freedom of thought, as when, for
example, it dissipates the effect of parental indoctrination.181
This point, in turn, leads to a second problem. Whatever the merits of Jackson’s eloquent attack
on compelled orthodoxy in other contexts, it is hard to reconcile with the way that public education
actually functions. Public education is shot through with compelled orthodoxy. Indeed, the
transmission of a unifying body of common knowledge and belief is the central aim of the enterprise.182
Children who write essays defending white supremacy in their civics classes or insist on the Ptolemaic
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system in their science classes do not tend to get good grades.183 Jackson writes that “[f]ree public
education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality, will not be partisan or
enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction.”184 But Jackson could only make this assertion by wrongly
associating secularism with “political neutrality” and his own contestable beliefs with nonpartisanship.
That conflation is incompatible with the very intellectual freedom that the opinion celebrates, but it is
fully consistent with progressive elitism.
For these reasons, Barnette fits awkwardly within the individual rights canon. To understand
what the opinion is really about, one must know something about the events that transpired between
the Court’s original decision upholding compelled flag salutes and its ultimate decision invalidating the
practice.
As Vincent Blasi and Seana Shiffrin detail in their riveting account,185 in the immediate wake of
Gobitis, there were hundreds of violent attacks on Jehovah’s Witnesses. In one incident, Witnesses
were “forced. . . to drink large quantities of castor oil, roped . . . together, then paraded . . . through
town.” In two Wyoming incidents, Witnesses were beaten and tarred and feathered. In still another
incident “vigilantes pulled [a] Witness . . . from his car, draped a flag over the hood, and when he
refused their demand that he salute the flag, slammed his head against the hood for nearly thirty
minutes as the chief of police looked on.”186 Altogether, in 1940, there were attacks against almost
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1500 Witnesses in 335 incidents in 44 states.187 Over two thousand Witness children in 48 states were
expelled from school for refusal to salute the flag.188
Barnette does not explicitly mention any of these events, but there is no doubt that the justices
were aware of them. According to Shawn Francis Peters, Jackson’s original draft referred to the postGobitis violence, but Chief Justice Stone warned Jackson that the allusions might promote “the
impression that our judgment of the legal question was affected by the disorders.” At Stone’s strong
urging, Jackson removed the direct references.189 Instead, he made his point inferentially by detailing
“the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity, . . . the Inquisition,. . . the Siberian exiles, . . . down to the
fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”190
Jackson’s concern was rooted in progressive fears about populism unchained. The fear was not
solely about government impingement on individual rights. After all, Jackson was an opponent of the
view that “liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints” or that
“government should be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s
affairs.” The fear was about private, rather than public power. It was that Jehovah’s Witnesses, a small
and powerless group, was being victimized by popular hatred and prejudice. A paroxysm of mass
violence required active government intervention, not the acquiescence in private arrangements that
traditional civil liberties entails. For Jackson, the government intervention took the form of invalidating
legislation that fueled the violence.
The concern was reinforced by elite disdain for empty, symbolic ritual. Jackson was willing to
tolerate flag salute ceremonies designed to promote nationalism when they were purely “voluntary.”
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He nonetheless wrote that the ceremonies were “a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas .
. . a short cut from mind to mind.”191 This “short cut” was no substitute for the hard intellectual work
necessary to reach the kinds of conclusions that merited respect. True national unity was the product of
“persuasion and example,”192 not compelled ritual. Jackson was confident of the “appeal of our
institutions to free minds” and protective of “intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities
that we owe to exceptional minds.”193
This rhetoric fits uncomfortably with the Witness’ actual objections to the flag salute, based as
they were on religious faith rather than in secular, intellectual analysis. But it is hardly a surprise that
progressive justices would use arguments like this to support their position. The arguments are rooted
in a commitment to voluntarism, rationality, and Enlightenment values. They implicitly discount the
roles of history, culture, habit, ritual, and indoctrination as sources of value and methods by which
values are transmitted. Put differently, as populists would undoubtedly have pointed out, the
arguments are deeply hostile to the ways in which many Americans come to their views.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Roberts and Reed, dissented in Barnette, but his opinion
was hardly a defense of populism. Instead, the argument between the dissent and the majority
amounted to an intermural quarrel between progressives. Frankfurter did not defend mass opinion,
much less mass violence. As “[o]ne who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in
history,”194 he hardly could. As a personal matter he “whole-heartedly associate[d] [himself] with the
general libertarian views in the Court’s opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a
lifetime.”195 But for Frankfurter, the lesson to be drawn from the progressive triumph that he helped
bring about was that judges should generally abstain from interferences with the political branches,
191
192
193
194
195

Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

44
which could, on the whole, be trusted to produce wise and humane public policy. In a passage that
directly tied the flag salute controversy to the earlier dispute in Dayton, he asked
[I]s this Court to enter the old controversy between science and religion by unduly defining the
limits within which a state may experiment with its school curricula? The religious conscience of
some parents may be offended by subjecting their children to the biblical account of creation,
while another state may offend parents by prohibiting a teaching of biology that contradicts
such Biblical account. Compare Scopes v. State . . . .196
Of course, self-restraint of this sort depends on a faith that government institutions will be
mostly a force for good even if they occasionally adopt retrograde policies. But as a lifelong progressive,
Frankfurter understood that a failure of this faith doomed the progressive platform as a whole. He was
prepared to resolve “Bernie’s confusion” by an unambiguous embrace of government power.
Accordingly, he warned that the majority’s support for freedom of speech and religion might also
support “[t]he right not to have property without just compensation”197 – a right that had notoriously
stood in the way of progressive reforms. For him, the proper analogies were not to the Roman
suppression of Christianity or the Inquisition. Instead, like Holmes in Buck, he invoked standard
progressive programs for public betterment like “compulsory vaccination” and “food inspection
regulation.”198 And in a chilling, if perhaps unintentional, reminder of Buck, he added “compulsory
medical treatment” to his list.199
On this reading, then, both Jackson’s and Frankfurter’s opinions defended progressivism against
populist rivals. For Jackson, that defense meant standing up to mass pressure that threatened sensible,
unbiased government institutions like the public schools. For Frankfurter, it meant defending
government against claims of individual rights.
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Channeling James Madison,200 Jackson, warned that “small and local authorit[ies]” might be
more susceptible to mass pressure.201 Frankfurter might have responded by celebrating local, direct
democracy, as populists often did. Instead, he emphasized that “[t]he flag salute requirement . . . comes
before us with the full authority of the State of West Virginia. . . . To suggest that we are here concerned
with the heedless action of some village tyrants is to distort the augustness of the constitutional
issue.”202 No one suggested that “some village” might be the best venue for determining school policy,
that citizens of such a village might feel legitimately threatened by challenges to the sacred ceremonies
that defined their culture, or that their school curricula might be rooted in something other than the
“ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality.” The silence proved to be ominous, but its
consequences were delayed by a mid-century flowering of progressive constitutionalism.
IV. The Warren Court and Its Aftermath
One can draw a direct line from Skinner and Barnette to much of the Warren Court’s work.
Relying on Skinner’s invocation of “strict scrutiny,” the Warren Court subjected racial classifications and
classifications impinging on a “fundamental interest” to heightened review.203 Relying on Skinner’s
invocation of reproductive rights, the Warren Court began an inquiry204 that culminated in Roe v.
Wade.205 Barnette’s emphasis on secularism and rationality in public education led to the banning of
prayers in public schools,206 limits on the funding for parochial schools,207 invalidating a prohibition on
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the teaching of evolution in public schools208 and the outlawing of school segregation.209 Its emphasis
on freedom of inquiry led to the Warren Court’s free speech activism,210 including its defense of
academic freedom211 and of erotic literature.212
Of course, it is a mistake to abstract from the various social and political forces that produced
Warren Court progressivism. There was nothing automatic or mechanical about the movement from
Barnette and Skinner to the reformist judicial activism of the 1950s and 60s. The connection is
nonetheless worth emphasizing because it sheds a different and revealing light on the Warren Court
experience.
In his famous synthesis, John Hart Ely argued that the Warren Court could best be understood as
“reinforcing” democratic processes. 213 On his view, most of the Court’s work did not rest on
contestable substantive value judgments. Instead, the Court was in the business of insuring fair
representation by preventing political insiders from locking out their opponents and by protecting
“discrete and insular minorities” from the prejudice that blocked their full political participation.214 The
Court’s free speech, voting rights, and reapportionment decisions were prime examples of the first
effort.215 Its campaign against racial discrimination exemplified the second effort.216 On Ely’s account,
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the pivot point in the Court’s history comes with footnote 4 of Carolene Products217 and the Court’s
reconciliation of liberal judicial activism with anti-Lochnerism.218
No doubt, there is something to this account, but the account also misses something important
that studying the progressive/populist split reveals. In a less well-known but equally brilliant
synthesis,219 Lucas A. Powe points out the extent to which Warren Court activism rested on two very
different pillars: An effort to bring rural and southern America into the mainstream northern, suburban
and urban political culture,220 and an unbridled faith in the power of government-led reform.221
Although Powe himself does not put it this way, both pillars illustrate the victory of progressive over
populist constitutionalism. They provide a way to understand constitutional conflicts if one focuses on
Scopes and Buck instead of on Lochner and Carolene Products.
The first effort is illustrated by the reapportionment decisions. It is easy to see why Ely treated
the cases as grounded in support for democratic processes, but as Justice Frankfurter among others
pointed out,222 democratic theory is open textured and contested. The Court’s rejection of a state-wide
referendum mandating a malapportioned upper house223 – the kind of direct, popular democracy that
populists favored – was certainly not required by uncontroversial tenets of democratic theory. Nor
would it be hard to construct a version of the theory that treated rural voters as a “discrete and insular
minority” entitled to institutional protection. What is beyond dispute, though, is the fact that the
reapportionment cases massively shifted electoral power from the countryside to the emerging urban
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and suburban areas.224 As a cultural matter, reapportionment was a triumph for the educated and
cosmopolitan middle and upper classes. Its victims were the already isolated and downwardly mobile
rural voters.
In still more obvious ways, the Court’s desegregation decisions attacked what was then thought
of as southern exceptionalism. It did not escape the attention of southern populists that the Court
quickly lost its zeal for the integration process when the battle moved from the rural south to the urban
north.225
Despite this fact, no one should deny Ely’s point that prejudice against racial minorities, as well
as more overt denials of the franchise, sharply limited black political power. Nor should anyone doubt
the Warren Court’s good faith when it grappled with the problem of racial justice. Still, there was
nothing inevitable about the Court’s proposed solution to this problem. As Derrick Bell and Gary Peller
have powerfully demonstrated, the black community was divided between integrationist and black
nationalist critiques of white racism.226 In a counterfactual world where African Americans were fairly
represented in our political institutions, it is anyone’s guess who would have won this struggle.
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It follows that a Court devoted to representation reinforcement might have endorsed black
nationalist remedies that would have required massive public investments in black communities and
institutions. Instead, the Court effectively mandated the destruction of those institutions. It embraced
a progressive view that emphasized the irrationality of racial differences and the need to assimilate
African Americans into a sensible, meritocratic, and rationalistic white culture.227
The Warren Court’s criminal justice decisions stemmed from similar impulses. As many have
pointed out, the justices thought of criminal justice reform as a branch of its racial justice project.228 The
target was mostly southern, racist police forces that used state violence to enforce racial subjugation.
The objective was to “modernize” and “professionalize” policing by making it more scientific and
rational.229 A populist approach might, instead, have focused on democratizing policing and providing for
direct community involvement and control.
The desegregation and criminal justice cases also illustrate the second of Powe’s two hallmarks
of Warren Court activism: unconstrained optimism about the possibilities of social transformation
through the forceful use of government power. The Warren Court appears to have actually believed
that racism could be eradicated by the integration of public education; that Miranda warnings230 and
suppression of illegally seized evidence231 could eliminate police violence and professionalize law
enforcement; that a speech marketplace that was “robust” and “wide open”232 would yield sensible
public policy; and that disputes about matters like abortion, pornography, and prayer could be settled
by calm study of the empirical evidence.
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With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that these predictions were wildly optimistic.
For present purposes, though, it is important to emphasize that they were connected to the general
Progressive faith in progress and rationality and rejection of Populist fears about elitism and
condescension. The point is obscured by the fact that Warren Court reforms often involved the
invalidation of legislation. If one thinks of progressivism as emphasizing the power of the political
branches, that fact seems anomalous. If instead, one thinks of progressivism as entailing an effort to
cleanse the political processes of popular prejudice and irrationality, the paradox dissolves.
The Warren Court was liberal, and liberalism is an amalgam of contradictory progressive and
populist impulses. It is therefore unsurprising that there were also populist strands in Warren Court
jurisprudence. For example, its efforts to deal with the problem of poverty reflected a populist
sensibility. Decisions that guaranteed the right of poor people to representation in criminal trials,233
that prohibited jailing of defendants too poor to pay fines,234 that abolished the poll tax,235 and that
protected the rights of welfare recipients236 all suggested a concern about class-based exclusion from
full citizenship.
It is nonetheless striking that the Warren Court was at its most tentative when it embraced the
class problem. The Court never quite got around to saying that wealth discrimination was a suspect
classification or that there was a fundamental interest in the means of subsistence. Reforms to protect
the poor and powerless in the criminal justice system were linked to the rise of waiver that made the
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reforms more theoretical than real.237 The possibility of a jury trial was of little value in a world where
the vast majority of cases ended in plea bargain.238
When the conservative counterrevolution began, the left-populist strands of Warren Court
activism were among the first to be disowned. The revolution began slowly and tentatively,239 but
eventually it picked up steam and, at this writing, is poised to achieve something like complete victory.
How did this happen? There are many explanations, ranging from Warren Court overreaching,
macro-level political and economic changes, and luck in the timing of Supreme Court vacancies. For
purposes of this article, though, it is useful to emphasize the connection between the conservative
victory and the internal weaknesses and contradictions in both populist and progressive approaches to
constitutional law. That is the subject of the next Part.
V. What Happened in Kansas
A. Populism’s Conservative Transformation
From the beginning, populism was beset by a fatal contradiction. The movement was grounded
in anger and resentment directed at economic injustice. On occasion, populists favored strong
government action – for example, vigorous antitrust enforcement or nationalization of some major
industries – to fight their wealthy oppressors. But many populists also believed that they were being
victimized by a gigantic conspiracy that involved both the private and public sectors. Legislators and
judges had sold out to the rich and powerful, and government collusion with the railroads and producers
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had driven down the incomes of ordinary people.240 But if government was the enemy, then how could
it also be the solution?
The contradiction might have been resolved by popular democracy. The first step was for an
aroused citizenry to take direct control of government. Once the takeover had been effected, then a
newly invigorated and corruption-free state could marshal government power to protect the people
from predation.241
Unfortunately, this resolution posed a variety of problems of its own. First, it was always
unclear how popular democracy could be put in place. Certainly, state plutocrats were not about to
agree to procedural reforms that would guarantee their own defeat. Revolutionary Marxists had a
solution to this problem, but populists did not. The very pervasiveness of the corruption they decried
made implausible the solution they proposed.
Second, the resolution fell victim to the populist conceit that there was a united, virtuous, and
wise “people,” which could somehow be given voice without distortion produced by intermediate
institutions.242 Of course, in the real world, the people are not united and not always virtuous or wise.243
Because the people are not united, mechanisms must be put in place to measure how many
people favor one policy over another. As a later generation of political theorists demonstrated, any
means of aggregating conflicting preferences produces distortions.244 And even this characterization
may be simplistic. “Distortions” implies that before mediating institutions take hold, there is some
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undistorted “general will.” But modern social science also supports the view that opinions and
preferences are always situated within a matrix of power, culture and politics and never exist in some
pure and unpolluted state.245
Because people are not always virtuous or wise, filtering mechanisms are sometimes necessary
to make reform effectual. Populist romantics assumed that there were simple solutions to problems of
social justice. If only the people were allowed to rule, social disintegration could be halted and
economic misery could be eradicated. But of course solutions are rarely simple. Real government
programs that really ameliorate economic dislocation must deal with complex problems and avoid
unintended consequences. That requires experts who do not have to respond to the immediate
demands of a sometimes ill-informed electorate.
These weaknesses left populism vulnerable to a right wing takeover. When populist efforts to
establish direct democracy predictably failed, either because it could not be effectuated or because,
once effectuated, it produced disappointing outcomes, populists were left with no solution to the
problem of plutocratic government. In the absence of a solution, populism turned into the politics of
despair and grievance. With the hope of democratic transformation shattered, all that remained of the
populist impulse was distrust of government as currently constituted – a distrust reinforced by
exogenous shocks like Vietnam, Watergate, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and
the Great Recession. The upshot was a populism that was more aligned with conservative opposition to
government regulation than with traditional left-wing arguments for government intervention.
Matters were made worse by populism’s historic association with Manichean and conspiratorial
thinking that intersected in toxic ways with deeply engrained American racism. Like their forbearers,
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modern populists attribute their misfortunes to the evil scheming of people who are not part of “The
People” – to elites, immigrants, and racial minorities.246 Once detached from a more optimistic and
inclusive politics directed at popular control and government reform, the attribution produces free
floating cultural resentment and nihilistic rage.
This transformation has had its most profound effect on our general political culture, but it has
also influenced modern constitutional culture. Counterintuitive as it might seem, we stand at the
threshold of a populist constitutional moment.
The claim seems counterintuitive because the modern Supreme Court is the most businessfriendly in memory. Over a wide range of issues, including administrative law,247 access to justice,248
free speech law,249 and statutory construction,250 the Court has systematically favored business
interests. But the violated intuition is rooted in outdated assumptions about populism’s leftward tilt.
Most of the emerging conservative constitutional agenda is compatible with or has roots in a modern
populism that has given up on government.251
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The emerging alliance between populists and conservatives is most obvious with regard to the
regulatory state. In its most extreme form, and when combined with populist conspiracy theories, the
attack morphs into worries about the “deep state” that secretly controls the government. For now at
least, these worries bother only people associated with the Trump administration or otherwise
vulnerable to paranoid fantasies.252 However, more moderate versions of the same claims are poised to
become part of mainstream constitutional thinking.253 Advocates of the unitary executive,254 of
overruling Chevron,255 of revival of the nondelegation doctrine,256 and of “the constitution in exile,”257
claim that the federal bureaucracy is unaccountable, undemocratic, and populated by elites who fail to
understand American values.
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Of course, conservatives and populists often have different motives for these attacks. For some
conservatives, the regulatory state is dangerous because of its potential to upset the economic status
quo, which they view as just and desirable. Right wing populists, in contrast, often remain angry at
economic injustice. What they have lost is their faith in the possibility of radical transformation of
government that would make it a force for good rather than evil. Faced with the choice between “free”
markets and rule by corrupt government elites who have no understanding of their culture and values,
many modern populists are prepared to choose the former.
A second, closely related prong of the conservative constitutional agenda – the revival of
federalism and of judicially enforced limits on congressional power – has similar populist roots. No
doubt, many conservatives favor these changes because the federal government poses the greatest
threat of enacting and enforcing redistributive programs.258 However, the judicial rhetoric of federalism
rarely mentions this fear. Instead, the justices regularly resort to rhetoric about the need for
government close to the people and accountable to popular opinion – rhetoric that is long associated
with the populist critique.259
The most interesting overlap between conservative constitutionalism and modern populism
pertains to civil liberties. Consider, for example, the fact that Justice Thomas recently devoted nineteen
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pages of the U.S. Reports to an extended essay linking abortion to eugenics260 and both to Darwinian
thought261 and to “progressives, professionals, and intellectual elites.”262
Of course, the analogy between state mandated sterilization and individual choices about
childrearing is far from perfect,263 but that fact should not distract us from the way in which Justice
Thomas takes advantage of early twentieth century populist tropes. Like William Jennings Bryan before
him, Thomas reinterprets progressive support for individual rights as an effort to control subordinate
groups that in his view make progressives uncomfortable.
Similarly, the Court’s emerging concern for the rights of conservative Christians264 echoes in
obvious ways the worries that brought Bryan out of retirement almost a century ago.265 The Court has
moved strongly to protect prayer in public places,266 religious monuments and displays on public land,267
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and, somewhat less strongly, Christian businesspeople who do not want to provide service to gay
customers or contraception coverage to their employees.268
The Court has also moved to restrict affirmative action programs thought to harm the white
middle and lower classes.269 Instead of conceptualizing these programs as remedying centuries of
racism, it has focused on powerless whites, whose victimhood amounts to the unnoticed byproduct of
elite, racial condescension.270
Finally, the Court has greatly expanded free speech protection especially as it relates to the
regulation of business.271 These cases illustrate better than any other both the oddity and the
effectiveness of the conservative-populist alliance. In obvious ways, the new freedom of speech
advances the conservative agenda. It shields economic actors from the threat of government mandated
redistribution. One might think that populists would favor this redistribution, but their worry is the
mirror image of conservative fears. For them, the threat is not a government devoted to redistribution,
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but a government captured by the rich and powerful – the very elements of society who are their allies.
An alliance like this seems bound to disintegrate, and there are indeed tensions within it that might be
exploited.272 Still, these complementary but contradictory concerns have provided powerful motivation
for both sides, especially when combined with progressive nostalgia and sentimentality about freedom
of speech.
When the Court announces these decisions, it typically utilizes the dry language of constitutional
exegesis and statutory construction, but occasionally, the raw rhetoric of populism seeps through.
Consider, for example, Justice Scalia’s attack on his colleagues for their support for gay rights:
[T]he Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section of America. Take, for example, this Court, which
consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful lawyers who studied at Harvard or
Yale Law School. Four of the nine are natives of New York City. Eight of them grew up in eastand west-coast States. Only one hails from the vast expanse in-between. Not a single
Southwesterner or even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner (California does not count). Not
a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises about one quarter of Americans), or even
a Protestant of any denomination. . . . [T]o allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be
considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate
a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social
transformation without representation.273
With appropriate modifications, William Jennings Bryan might have said the same thing almost a
century earlier. Like Bryan before him, Scalia voiced the suspicion that what progressives think of as
protection for minority rights is actually a cover for elite denigration of the beliefs of ordinary
Americans.
Similarly, consider how Justice Thomas defends his position that the University of Michigan has
failed to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” justifying its affirmative action program. Like
populists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Thomas worries that wealthy and powerful
interests are systematically devaluing the welfare of the middle and lower classes. On his view, “[t]he
[University of Michigan] Law School’s decision to be an elite institution does little to advance the welfare
272
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of the people of Michigan or any cognizable interest of the state of Michigan. . . . With the adoption of
different admissions methods, such as accepting all students who meet minimum qualifications, the Law
School could achieve its vision.”274
A cynic might respond to this rhetoric by doubting the good faith of the people who use it. On
this view, conservatives are manipulating, rather than embracing populists. They are using populist
tropes to advance causes that are detrimental to the real interests of the dispossessed. Perhaps this
view is correct. As I have already argued, the conservative-populist alliance is fragile and vulnerable.
That said, the view elides the undeniable fact that both the rhetoric and the positions that the rhetoric
supports have deep roots in the American populist tradition. Moreover, the view itself has similarly
deep roots in the progressive tradition. It reflects the longstanding progressive inclination to believe that
ordinary people do not know what is best for them and must be guided by elites who better understand
their interests. That view, in turn, ignores the role that progressives themselves have played in populist
disillusionment. That is the subject of the next section.
B. Progressive Loss of Faith
Historically, populist distrust in government was countered or at least leavened by successful
progressive social reform. From the Square Deal through the Great Society, progressives met populist
claims that the government was irretrievably corrupt with actual programs that improved the lives of
vulnerable people. That success, in turn, reinforced the strains in populist thinking that had always been
sympathetic to at least some forms of government activism.
Two trends beginning in the 1960s and reaching a climax in our own period have sharply limited
this ability of progressives to temper populist distrust of government.
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The first trend related to the progressives’ turn toward racial justice. Throughout the New Deal
period and its immediate aftermath, race was far from the center of the progressive agenda. As the
eugenics controversy illustrates, some early progressives believed in “scientific racism.” 275 Even when
elite opinion changed, New Dealers were willing to embrace a bargain that exchanged white Southern
support for New Deal programs for New Deal acceptance of segregation and racial subordination.276
In the wake of the New Deal, there were sporadic attempts to break the stranglehold that the
South held over the Democratic Party. President Roosevelt made a spectacularly unsuccessful attempt
to purge Southern conservatives from his coalition in 1938,277 and northern Democrats were willing to
accept a southern walk out from the 1948 convention in order to enact a civil rights plank in their
platform.278 But it was not until the Warren Court period and the election of Lyndon Johnson that
progressives broke decisively with the racist south.279
When they did so, and as Johnson, himself, had predicted,280 progressives provoked a huge
populist backlash.281 As already noted, populism had a long, if not entirely unbroken, history of
racism.282 With the emergence of progressive support for racial justice, many populists now saw the
redistributive programs that they had previously supported through the lens of racial division. The
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upshot was a reinforcement of populist distrust of government and increased suspicion of progressive
elites.
The second trend involved a retrenchment of progressive ambition. Progressivism was never as
radical as Populism. Historically, progressives tended to be insiders rather than outsiders and reformers
rather than revolutionaries.283 Still, programs like Medicare, Social Security, and the GI Bill of Rights
provided material evidence of government’s capacity to improve the lives of ordinary citizens.
In recent years, however, progressive enthusiasm for large-scale reform has declined. When
progressives were actually in power, they ended “welfare as we know it,”284 embarked on a massive
deregulatory program,285 and promoted a “free trade” system that some perceived as decimating
American labor.286 Many Progressives made their peace with Wall Street and with a regulatory regime
that is more facilitative than disruptive. Piecemeal reform, exemplified by the Affordable Care Act,287
the Dodd-Frank banking reforms,288 and the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reforms,289 have
marginally improved the functioning of economic and political markets, but exponentially increased
their complexity and opacity.
Now out of power, some progressives have promised sweeping changes if only they are again
granted governing responsibility. Proposals for universal health care, free college tuition, and broad
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based changes in the tax code abound.290 But other progressives are doubtful at best about these
measures,291 and it remains to be seen whether a Democratic president and Congress would actually
attempt, much less succeed, in implementing them.
This decline of progressive ambition resulted, at least in part from the converse of the
contradiction that destroyed left-leaning populism. Whereas populists had to reconcile their support
for revolutionary change with their distrust of the government that might bring the change about,
progressives needed to reconcile their support for elite institutions with sympathy for the kind of people
routinely excluded from those institutions.
For populists, the contradiction was resolved by sullen distrust of government. For progressives,
it has been resolved by a combination of deep pessimism and patrician paternalism. Faith in
government has remained, but it is faith in a government staffed by policy experts who are resistant to
“simplistic” redistributive schemes and paralyzed by their understanding of the complexities of market
regulation and the possibilities of unintended consequences. This stance, reinforced by the dependence
of the Democratic party on large and wealthy donors, makes many modern progressives suspicious of
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“demagogic” proposals that in their view are likely to make things worse rather than better and are, in
any event, politically unattainable.292
In the absence of a broad based social vision, progressives have often retreated to
incrementalism, a reflexive defense of social programs already in place, and a devotion to identity
politics in support of various minority groups, more and more narrowly defined, thought to be subject to
discrimination. These stances, in turn, erode the sense that progressives stand for the general public
good and suggest that they are instead catering to entrenched interests. The result is that, at least until
recently, modern progressives offered no counterweight to populist distrust of government. Instead,
they reinforce the view that there is no real hope for meaningful social change. 293
Like the evolution of populism, the changed focus for progressives is most evident in the general
political culture. Unsurprisingly, though, it, too, manifests itself in constitutional doctrine. Even
progressives who promise profound change if they gain political power rarely speak of constitutionally
driven reform. Any serious hope that a new version of the Warren Court might transform the country is
long gone. Instead, progressive constitutionalists have become the new reactionaries. They have
devoted all their energy to worshiping the relics of past glory days without any real hope that the relics
might be removed from museums and actually put to good use.294
The one exception to this generalization proves the rule. Progressives on the Court have pushed
through an important reform agenda regarding the civil rights of LBGTQ Americans, culminating in the
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realization of the long-held dream of a constitutional right to same sex marriage.295 There is no denying
that this is a victory for justice that has made the lives of millions of Americans better. But the victory
also reflects some of the most problematic aspects of the progressive tradition. Like the progressive
embrace of abortion rights, the constitutionalization of LBGTQ rights is premised on the belief that
authentic disputes about morality can be resolved by reason if only people will accept uncontroversial
first premises. That assumption is linked to a disdain for conventional religious attitudes and a belief
that the value judgments of the educated classes are not value judgments at all, but instead the
necessary outcome of disinterested rationality. Put differently, here as in the past, individual rights
rhetoric masks resistance to mass control of government power.
Apart from gay rights, it is hard to think of any cause that modern progressive justices believe
could be achieved through constitutional, judicial intervention. There is little remaining interest in
constitutionalizing the rights of the poor, judicially led fundamental reform of the criminal justice
system, or transforming race relations. Instead, progressive constitutionalists now occupy themselves
with an entirely defensive and only occasionally successful effort to preserve the remains of a fast
receding past.
Progressive support for affirmative action provides a particularly striking example. The original
logic of Brown pushed toward a rejection of formal equality and a requirement of affirmative,
constitutionally compelled, government action to dismantle racial hierarchies. Formal equality between
the races – a separate but equal regime, with black and white students alike prohibited from attending
integrated schools– was unconstitutional because of its actual impact. This kind of formal equality
“affected the hearts and minds” of black students “in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”296 It followed
from this view that the formal dismantling of race-based legal structures was insufficient to meet the
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government’s constitutional responsibilities. Instead, school boards were constitutionally obligated to
develop affirmative plans for integration that actually “worked” and “worked now.”297 Necessarily,
those programs had to be race-conscious.298
A modern translation of this approach would make affirmative action not just constitutionally
permissible but constitutionally mandatory. It would require actual desegregation of private and public
schools throughout the country. Indeed, taken to the limits of its logic, it would mandate a wide variety
of sweeping affirmative measures designed to dismantle all manifestations of racial hierarchy. But no
modern justice takes this argument seriously. Instead, liberals on the Court have acquiesced to a
standard that makes affirmative action constitutionally problematic.299 They have fought an entirely
defensive battle to preserve a few voluntary programs that create some of the optics of a racially just
society while doing little to help the least advantaged or promote a racial transformation.
Worse yet, the apologetic stance of liberals serves to reinforce rather than attack racial
stereotypes. By acquiescing in the assumption that affirmative action is a necessary but limited
departure from otherwise unproblematic standards of merit, they communicate a belief that African
Americans can succeed only if they are given special privileges.
A left-populist stance on affirmative action might have countered this condescending narrative.
It might have built upon, rather than rejected, Justice Thomas’ critique of meritocracy to support the
opposite of the outcomes that Justice Thomas favors. 300 Liberal justices might have insisted that the
elite standards of “merit” that govern college and graduate school admissions reflect no more than the
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eminently contestable views of the rich and powerful as to who is deserving of privilege. Maintaining
these standards hardly constitute sufficient grounds for denying equal opportunity to all. But while this
argument might be advanced by populists, it is not in the progressive playbook. Progressives are too
committed to norms of objectivity and rationality to challenge the implicit bias that infects the effort to
measure these qualities.
Affirmative action law is emblematic of the sad state of progressive constitutionalism, but it is
not unique. The progressive position on gender discrimination suffers from similar problems. Thirty
years ago, progressive constitutionalism produced some important victories for gender equality by
removing overt gender distinctions from the law.301 The effort played to progressivism’s strength.
Progressive justices insisted on the necessity of neutral and objective standards that should replace old
fashioned, irrational stereotypes about sex and gender.
But that program ran out of steam long ago. Today, formal equality has become an end in itself,
divorced from the ambition of actually promoting justice. Two opinions by Justice Ginsburg, the
champion of progressive feminism, illustrate the point.
Consider first, Sessions v. Morales-Santana.302 At issue was the United States citizenship of a
child born to unmarried parents when only one parent was a United States citizen. The law provided
that if the child’s father was a United States citizen, the child was entitled to citizenship if the father had
lived in the United States for five years prior to the child’s birth. In contrast, if the unmarried mother
was a United States citizen, she could transmit citizenship to her child if she has lived in the United
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States for only one year.303 The Court held that this gender based distinction violated the equal
protection component of the due process Clause.304
As Justice Ginsburg implicitly acknowledged in her opinion for the Court,305 the decision
amounted to a mopping up operation. It dealt with a statute enacted more than three-quarters of a
century ago306 – one of the few remaining laws in the United States Code providing for facially
differential treatment based on gender. The Court used by now familiar rules about heightened scrutiny
for laws that are based on overbroad gender stereotypes to invalidate it.
As it happens, though, the stereotype – that unmarried mothers are more likely to influence the
upbringing of their children than unmarried fathers – is almost certainly statistically accurate.
Moreover, the statute actually provided better treatment for women than for men. If the stereotype is
indeed accurate, eliminating the differential treatment arguably retards rather than advances gender
justice.
Having found that the unequal treatment was unconstitutional, the Court nonetheless denied
the plaintiff relief. Because inequality can be remedied by either ratcheting up or ratcheting down, and
because, according to the Court, Congress would have preferred to ratchet down, the decision solved
the inequality problem by denying the more generous citizenship rule to everyone.307 The upshot is
that even though the plaintiff “won” his case, he did not benefit from the victory. More generally, and
tragically, citizenship is now available to a smaller number of people than enjoyed the benefit before the
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Court acted. In order to protect men from supposed discrimination, many more people, who, like the
plaintiff, have lived in this country for years, are now subject to deportation. Can this be what
progressive, constitutional feminism has turned into?
A second decision is more consequential and, therefore, even more disturbing. In United States
v. Virginia,308 Justice Ginsburg, again speaking for the Court, wrote that the exclusion of women from the
Virginia Military Academy (VMI) denied the women equal protection of the laws.
VMI was famous for its unusual “adversative training” techniques, which were characterized by
features like physical rigor, mental stress, absence of privacy, and minute regulation of behavior:
VMI cadets live in spartan barracks where surveillance is constant and privacy
nonexistent; they wear uniforms, eat together in the mess hall, and regularly participate in drills.
Entering students are incessantly exposed to the rat line, “an extreme form of the adversative
model,” comparable in intensity to Marine Corps boot camp. Tormenting and punishing, the rat
line bonds new cadets to their fellow sufferers and, when they have completed the 7–month
experience, to their former tormentors.309
Applying a heightened standard of review, the Court found that there was not an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for excluding women from this sort of training.310 The Court assumed that
“most women would not choose VMI’s adversative method,”311 but relied upon expert testimony to the
effect that some women were capable of meeting VMI’s physical standards. It followed that the
“categorical exclusion [of women] in total disregard of their individual merit” was unconstitutional.312
The condemnation of supposedly irrational or stereotypical generalizations based on gender is
at the core of the progressive feminist project. In Virginia, however, the project was complicated by the
state’s offer to establish a separate Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL), open only to
women, which would also train citizen soldiers, but do so through “a cooperative method that
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encourages self-esteem” rather than through the adversative method.313 There were real questions
about whether this separate institution would have the same resources and offer the same
opportunities as VMI,314 but the Court’s rejection of this alternative was apparently not based on these
questions. Instead, the problem was that the VWIL program did not offer the same adversative training
as VMI. As the Court explained “generalizations about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of what is
appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average description.”315
It is now more than twenty years since Justice Ginsburg wrote these words, and there is a sense
in which she has been proved right. VMI now trains a substantial number of women.316 Although it has
modified some of its standards to meet their needs,317 its program has not collapsed. There are
individual women who now have an opportunity that they did not have before the Court intervened.318
It is nonetheless striking how discordant the opinion is with the views of many feminists who do
not happen to be Supreme Court justices. Most significant is the Court’s readiness to accept the VMI
standards for success at face value. The Court’s analysis takes these standards as its starting point and
then argues that there are at least a few women who can meet them. It never addresses the possibility
that the reason only a few women can meet them is because they are, themselves, gendered. When
viewed from this perspective, preferring a system under which women must meet male standards at
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VMI to a system under which they could excel according to female standards at VWIL, harms, rather
than helps, women. That preference, in turn, is associated with the broader progressive resistance to
foundational challenges directed at existing institutions.
In some respects, Virginia is aberrational. The case is important because it illustrates what
progressive constitutionalists did with their power when they had it and, perhaps, why they no longer
have it. But the case was decided two decades ago. Today, progressives rarely control a majority of the
Court. Even if they wanted to, they are no longer positioned to offer a positive alternative to the
pessimism of modern populists. It is hard to see a scenario under which they will be back in control any
time soon. For the foreseeable future, a conservative-populist majority will be in the driver’s seat.
That fact, in turn, provides space for thinking about what might come next. Might progressives
yet pry populists away from conservative pessimism? Is there a way to reconcile populist skepticism
about government with progressive faith in the possibilities of reform? Put simply, can Bernie’s
confusion be resolved? That is the subject of the next Part.
VI. Conclusion: Is There a Way Forward?
This Article has focused on two sets of contradictions that plague the moderate American left.
The first set relates to American liberalism as a whole. Many liberals believe that the government is
thoroughly corrupted by the role that money plays in our politics, yet they also believe that expanded
government will be a force for social justice. They have failed to explain how a corrupted government
can serve as such a force.
The second set is internal to the progressive and populist components of American liberal
constitutionalism. Progressives believe in government intervention, but they have struggled to explain
how that belief can be reconciled with their libertarian stance toward putative constitutional rights like
free speech and reproductive freedom. Populists distrust government, but it is hard to reconcile that
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stance with their civil liberties skepticism in cases involving matters like the rights of religious minorities
in public schools.
Together, these contradictions have hobbled American liberalism. They help explain why, from
the perspective of American liberals, things have spun out of control. If this analysis is right, then
resolving the contradictions is a matter of some urgency. Can they be resolved?
There can be no complete resolution of the first contradiction, at least if we are prepared to give
full force to both sides of it. If government is truly and irredeemably corrupt, then we cannot look to
government to ameliorate the country’s social and moral deficiencies. To claim on the one hand that
the plutocrats control all levers of power in Washington but on the other that we should turn over our
healthcare system to the federal government is simply nonsensical.
Absent an external shock that produces truly revolutionary change, this problem is unlikely to go
away. It follows that liberal victories are fated to be fragile and partial. It does not follow, though, that
nothing at all can be accomplished. It remains possible to make things marginally better if we decline to
give full force to either side of the argument. Perhaps the government is sometimes, but not always,
corrupt. Perhaps government can sometimes, but not always, push toward social justice.
At its best moments, American liberalism has pragmatically adjusted policy to navigate between
the progressive and populist position. On the one hand, populists surely have a point when they
emphasize the risk of government capture. When the risk is serious, liberals should insist on popular
control and be skeptical of government intervention when that control is not in place. On the other,
populists must recognize that the only realistic hope of countering private power is through government
regulation. They need to pay attention when progressives point to historical examples where
government regulation at least for a time has authentically advanced the general welfare. As the
historian Michael Kazin has argued:
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[T]he path to success of movements that do not favor revolution has always run through
reform-minded members of the existing establishment, aspiring members of the counter-elite,
or both. New kinds of laws, administrative bodes, and elected officials are the harvest of all that
the pamphlets, strikes, and demonstrations – the repertoire of discontent – have sown. . . .
Legitimacy of this sort carries a price, of course. Movements usually have to shear off
their radical edges and demonstrate, that, if necessary, they can march to the rhetorical beat of
an influential set of allies. The boundaries, as well as the benefits, of this relationship – in all
their historical specificity – are central to what the friends of “the people” have been able to say
and what they have been able to achieve.319
Of course, actually assembling political majorities for reform presents difficult problems. I am
hardly in a position to provide a roadmap or checklist. One thing seems relatively clear, though: Putting
together such a coalition is ultimately a political and practical problem, rather than a conceptual and
theoretical one. Instead of focusing on theoretical global contradictions that can drive people apart,
successful politicians focus on local, practical compromise that can bring them together.
It does not follow, though, that politicians should altogether ignore the forces that have driven
progressives and populists apart. Liberals will need to regain the trust of populists suspicious of
progressivism. That will require more sensitivity to populist concerns about denigration of their mores
and beliefs, more flexibility and openness in administering reforms, and, most significantly, more of the
courage, creativity, and determination necessary to advance serious reform. All this is easier said than
done, but the problems are resolvable at least in principle, and recent events suggest that things are
moving in the right direction.
What about the narrower problems of liberal constitutionalism? The first step forward is a
diagnosis of the problem’s causes. At bottom, progressive support for civil liberties is not what it seems
to be. An authentic embrace of individual rights would in fact be inconsistent with progressive faith in
collective decision making. The progressive contradiction disappears when one realizes that progressive
concern has often been more about elite power than individual rights. Similarly, populist rejection of
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civil liberties is easy to misunderstand. A true defense of untrammeled public power would be
inconsistent with populist fears of government corruption. The populist contradiction disappears when
one realizes that the populist concern is more about preventing government denigration of ordinary
citizens than about protecting government prerogatives.
This diagnosis, in turn, leads to possibilities for solutions. As a practical matter, conservatives
are likely to be in control of the Supreme Court for the foreseeable future. Still, the situation would be
improved if it were possible to rupture the alliance between constitutional conservatives and populists.
Conservatives should be forced to defend their deregulatory agenda on its merits without hiding behind
populist rhetoric.320
Rupturing the alliance is work that populists will have to do for themselves; progressives who
think that lecturing others will achieve their goal are once again indulging their propensity for elite
condescension. There are nonetheless things that progressives can do to ease the transition. Resolving
the first contradiction is an important step in the right direction. If progressives succeed in formulating
and defending government programs that achieve and are perceived to achieve real benefits, populist
constitutionalist distrust of government may wane. That change in attitude, in turn, might produce
more skepticism about conservative populist rhetoric.
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Change in the general political environment is part of the solution, but there also needs to be
change within liberal constitutionalism itself. Progressives must stop insisting that disputes about value
can be definitively resolved by disinterested, lawyerly exegesis of the Constitution. They need to stop
pretending that their constitutional positions are ones that all rational and sensible people must accept.
That insistence mistakes partial, elite viewpoints for universal principle. The mistake will be corrected
only when progressives stop demanding adherence to civil liberties orthodoxy and give up the
authoritarian insistence that the Constitution simply requires the results that they favor.
A few academics have shown that there is a way forward. A generation ago, Richard Parker’s
path breaking defense of populist constitutionalism effectively attacked liberal orthodoxy.321 More
recent work by scholars like, Larry Kramer,322 Sanford Levinson,323 Joseph Fishkin, and William
Forbath,324 Ganesh Sitaraman,325 David Fontana,326 Rosaland Dixon and Julie Suk,327 and Mark Tushnet328
have demonstrated how a certain kind of constitutionalism might be reconciled with populist impulses.
One might embrace the overarching goals of the Constitution – the ambition to provide for the common
defense and for the general welfare and to ensure that all American inhabitants enjoy equal protection
and due process – without insisting that these shared commitments are more than an invitation to a
conversation about what is to be done.
But most of these scholars are working on the fringes of American liberalism. The American
Constitution Society, the semi-official voice of liberal constitutionalism, too often speaks in favor of a
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constitutionalism that is legalistic, proscriptive, and elitist.329 The Society’s allies in the law schools and
on the courts have similar commitments.
It does not follow that liberals should silently acquiesce to the worst impulses embedded in the
populist tradition. They can and must stand strong against racism, misogyny, xenophobia, and
homophobia.330 Progressives have much to learn from populists, but populists, too, must do some
learning. Importantly, though, the learning will come only when progressives are willing to defend their
position on the merits and not simply rely on constitutional compulsion.
Once these goals are accomplished, progressives and populists can begin to have a real
discussion about the prerequisites for a decent society. It would be expecting too much to suppose that
these conversations will produce a permanent détente. The gap between progressive and populist
sensibilities is too wide and the history of conflict too fraught to produce a lasting coalition. At some
future point, frustration, resentment, and anger will again drive the two sides of liberalism apart, as it
always has in the past. But if periods of rupture are part of the history of modern liberalism, so too are
periods when contradictions have been papered over and old divisions patched up. An overlapping
consensus has emerged in the past, and it can emerge in the future. Temporary though it may be, such
a consensus is more important now than ever before as we face the looming crisis of social and
constitutional disintegration.
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